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# ATOMIC AUDIT

THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES  
OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
SINCE 1940

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TABLE 1-1. Auditing the Manhattan Project: Where Did the Money Go?

Cumulative costs in millions of dollars as of December 31, 1945

<i>Site/program</i>	<i>Then-year dollars<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Constant 1996 dollars</i>
Oak Ridge (total)	1,188.35	13,565.66
K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant	512.17	5,846.64
Y-12 Electromagnetic Plant	477.63	5,452.41
Clinton Engineer Works—HQ and central utilities	155.95	1,780.26
Clinton Laboratories	26.93	307.44
S-50 Thermal Diffusion Plant	15.67	178.90
Hanford engineer works	390.12	4,453.47
Special operating materials	103.37	1,180.01
Los Alamos Project	74.06	845.38
Research and development	69.68	795.45
Government overhead	37.26	425.29
Heavy-water plants <sup>b</sup>	26.77	305.57
Total	1,889.61	21,570.83

Source: Original data from Hewlett and Anderson, *1939/1946*, p. 11.

a. Includes capital and operations costs from 1942 through 1945. Costs adjusted using a base year of 1944. Actual costs per facility per year are apparently unknown.

b. Designed and constructed by E. B. Badger and Sons and the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada in Trail, British Columbia, and by E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company in Morgantown, West Virginia; Montgomery, Alabama; and Dana, Indiana.

but preparations for "Operation Crossroads" kept about one-eighth of the scientists busy.<sup>55</sup> There was no question, however, that the program would continue after the war. At a meeting of the Interim Committee on May 31, 1945 (formed by Secretary of War Stimson to consider post-war policy options for the atomic bomb and including Stimson, Groves, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, Oppenheimer, Lawrence, Bush, MIT president Karl T. Compton, Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard, Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton, and Secretary of State-designate James F. Byrnes), Lawrence spoke forcefully in favor of continued production, recommending "that a program of plant expansion be vigorously pursued and at the same time a sizable stock pile of bombs and material should be built up" to ensure that the nation would "stay out in front." Later in the meeting, Byrnes "expressed the view, *which was generally agreed to by all present*, that the most desirable program would be to push ahead as fast as possible in

55. Jonathan Weisgall, *Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994), p. 137.